| Contents > Trajectory of Japan’s security policy: the power of perceptions by Kyoko Hatakeyama |
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Thus, this transition, along with the ideological change by the Japan Socialist Party, further facilitated a broadening of the scope of action. A consequence of the political realignment was well illustrated by Koizumi’s quick decision to support the US-led “war on terrorism” by quickly adopting a special legislation which enabled dispatch of the SDF. Although Koizumi exercised strong leadership to forge a larger military role even outside Japan’s territory, it would not have been possible without a shared perception over its security role.
When two civilian police officers were killed in 1993 at the time of peace keeping operations in Cambodia, these deaths gave rise to debates over the safety of Japanese personnel and compatibility of these troops with the constitutional mandates. Koizumi, who was then Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, clearly opposed participation in peace keeping operations in dangerous areas saying “we are not ready to shed blood for the sake of other countries’ peace” (Memorandum, 1993). In contrast, his decisions to send the SDF to the Persian Gulf and then Iraq in 2003, despite the death of two Japanese diplomats by a terrorist attack before the latter decision, clearly illustrates his changed perception towards security matters in the meantime. Likewise, the perception of the Japanese public also changed due to shifting international developments. The public receptiveness of a larger military role was in part demonstrated by Koizumi’s second election as president of the LDP in September 2003. This victory was solidified in the November 2003 election. Changing perceptions of the Japanese enabled the government to broaden its role even in military field.
Conclusion
Responding to the unstable international situation, the Japanese government skilfully, if tentatively, increased its military scope within the framework of the UN and the Japan-US alliance. Why was the Japanese government able to broaden the scope of military action in response to “war on terrorism” while blocked from dispatching the SDF even for evacuation operations at the time of the Gulf Crisis? This larger scope was neither the by-product of a re-emergence of Japanese militarism nor a direct response to foreign pressure. Japan was quite naturally not totally indifferent to pressure asking it to assume the burden of its responsibilities as a major power. Rather, as we have seen, Japan’s changed international engagement was a direct quest for a greater military role as a result of changed perceptions and domestic circumstances. It is undeniable that a top-down approach by political elites within the governmental sphere pushed Japan into taking a larger military role. Yet, as I have argued, it would not have been plausible without changed perceptions of the government and a changed domestic political environment. At its root was a change of perception by the Japanese public. In other words, not only top-down but also more surprisingly, a bottom-up approach made its own decisive impact on Japan’s decision making.
Japan’s foreign policy posture in the 1990s is often perceived as a response to US expectations and foreign pressure. Yet I have argued that this posture was driven by other factors as well. This paper then, endeavoured to show that Japan’s foreign policy stance is best understood by underlying changes in national security perceptions. It was the power of perceptions which pushed Japan to take up a more active security policy.
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| Contents > Trajectory of Japan’s security policy: the power of perceptions by Kyoko Hatakeyama |