| Contents > Trajectory of Japan’s security policy: the power of perceptions by Kyoko Hatakeyama |
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Tempered Japanese sensitivity towards security issues was also clearly demonstrated by the adoption of the Emergency Laws in June 2003. The general acceptance of these laws shows a new found Japanese receptiveness to military approaches. Public, not to mention governmental, perception of imminent security threats changed with the new millennium due to the September attacks in the US in 2001 and Bali as well as the possibility of a North Korean attack. These international developments drove home a sense of insecurity.3 Without such laws, it was obvious in the eyes of the Japanese that the government would not be able to respond quickly and appropriately to an unpredictable threat. As a result, an overwhelming majority (202 vs. 32 in the Upper House) adopted the law (Asahi Shimbun, 2001). In contrast to a public overreaction to the 1965 revelations which centred on a secret study group set up by the government with a view to exploring the concept of Emergency Laws, this time the public were receptive. On the governmental level a broad consensus including the ruling coalition (the LDP, the New Conservative Party and New Komeito) and two opposition parties supported this change. The changed perception thus enabled the government to introduce new laws dealing with responses to armed attacks.
Ramification of easing sensitivity of the Japanese towards military matters and a growing consensus on becoming a “normal country” extended to political alignment. After the end of the long-term domination by the LDP, a coalition government was formed by the LDP, the Sakigake Party and the Japan Socialist Party with Tomiichi Murayama from the Japan Socialist Party as Prime Minister in 1994. Inauguration of the coalition government meant a considerable loss of influence by the previous largest opposition party, namely, the Japan Socialist Party. The party had a history of successful opposition to any suggestion of a more active role for Japan in security issues. However, the party abandoned its long-standing principle after the inauguration, admitting the SDF and the alliance with the US.4 Given the incremental acceptance by the public of the SDF and the Japan-US security treaty, and, more importantly, the reality that the SDF and the security treaty have occupied vital part of Japan’s security policy, the Japan Socialist Party could not stick to its pacifist policy anymore if it wanted to remain in the coalition government. Ironically, this major change in its ideology was a serious blow for the Japan Socialist Party itself, exemplified by the loss of 1996 election for the House of Representative, which opened the way to the revival of the LDP. Hence, a major domestic constraint disappeared. For the first time, Japan’s attitude in security affairs reached consensus, albeit excluding the Communist Party, at least in the two points—legitimacy of the SDF and of the Japan-US security treaty. This major change in the Japan Socialist Party’s ideology, which meant the disappearance of the major opposition party, illustrated perceptual changes in the Japanese society, paving the way for a “more active Japan” even in the security field.
In addition, further political realignment contributed to a shift of Japan’s security policy. In 1998, the Shinshinto and other members from small partieswere regrouped into Jiyuto (the Liberal Party) and Minshu-to (Democratic Party of Japan), which were eventually united as Minshu to (Democratic Party) in September 2003. All parties were, unlike the Japan Socialist Party, supportive of Japan’s international contribution even militarily through the SDF, although there were slight dissimilarities between them.5 In other words, the blueprints of the opposition parties and the LDP had much in common. This meant, after reaching consensus in the two points in 1994, Japan had accommodated two or three parties at some time, which were committed to maintain the alliance with the US and supported SDF’s larger role as an international contribution (Hughes, 1999, pp. 16, 17). The Democratic Party went even further by stating its willingness to allow the SDF to participate in multinational forces (Asahi Shimbun, 2004). It had been a taboo to talk about military matters up to the Gulf War but the changed perceptions allowed politicians to be outspoken.
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| Contents > Trajectory of Japan’s security policy: the power of perceptions by Kyoko Hatakeyama |