| Contents > Trajectory of Japan’s security policy: the power of perceptions by Kyoko Hatakeyama |
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Trajectory of Japan’s security policy:
the power of perceptions
Introduction
Japan had long depended on the US for its national security, and enjoyed peace and stability without the burden of constructing its own security systems and institutions. The pursuit of economic prosperity had been given priority over security issues. In the 1990s, however, it seemed that Japan showed some distinct signs of change towards becoming a more proactive state even in the security field. The Gulf War triggered a changing perception by both the government and the public toward security issues. Japan then embarked on a new approach by expanding its role in security issues: the peace-keeping operation (PKO, hereafter) became a human resource contribution. The next step after accepting the PKO role was Japan’s increasing military position in the framework of the US alliance. The unstable regional situation exemplified by the North Korean threat gradually changed perceptions held by the government and the public. As a result voices emerged calling for a reinforced alliance with the US. Further, the September 11 attack provided Japan with a rationale to embrace a larger military role by invoking the name of the “war on terrorism”. Its quick response to cooperate with the US by adopting a special measures law made a stark contrast to its low-key posture in the Gulf War.
What led Japan gradually and tentatively to shift to a more active military role in the 1990s? Many scholars have argued that Japan has been reactive to foreign pressure, especially from the US. They see foreign pressure as a detrimental factor in Japan’s decision making process. These analysts attribute Japan’s sensitivity to US pressure to its heavy dependence on the US for trade and security (Miyashita, 2003; Orr, 1990). Others provide explanations based on Japan’s fragmented bureaucracy where each ministry pursues its own interests (Calder, 1988; Miyashita & Sato, 2001). Given this view, we could conclude that US pressure made Japan broaden the scope of its military action making a larger role more acceptable.
This article, however, challenges this widely accepted view that the “impetus to policy change to Japan is typically supplied by outside pressure” (Calder, 1988, p.518). If foreign pressure was a primary factor, these shifts would occur irrespective of the internal domestic situation and the public readiness to accept such a larger military role. However, trajectory of Japan’s security policy shows that changes of Japan’s security policy have been linked to internal factors rather than foreign pressure. A flaw of the argument, which seeks explanation only in external factors, is that it ignores Japan’s historical experiences. Military issues had long been subordinated to economic considerations; the Japanese people had been hypersensitive to security issues since the end of WWII. Not only the explicit constitutional limits but also cultural norms deeply embedded in Japanese minds had limited the possibility of Japan expanding its role in the area of security(Katzenstein, 1996). Therefore, trajectory of Japan’s shift shows gradual and cautious rather than dramatic change (Singh, 2002).
Three international events, namely the Gulf War, the unstable situation in the Asia-Pacific region and the September 11 attack, had overwhelming impacts on Japan, leading to a change of perceptions towards security issues among the Japanese as well as their governments. The change of perceptions resulted in a change of domestic political alignment and institutional positions. This changing perception and the changed domestic circumstances then may have given rise to a gradual shift in diplomacy and posture, eventually leading to an expansion of Japan’s military role. That is to say, contrary to the widely accepted view, the impetus to Japan’s security policy change was supplied by internal changes. To clarify the reasons for the shift, firstly, constraints on Japan’s security policy during the Cold War will be briefly examined. Secondly, I will examine how the constraints changed and, as a result, affected Japan’s security policy. This article shows that it was the power of perceptions that allowed the Japanese government to expand its military role.
Constraints on Japan’s security policy up to the 1990s
Since the end of World War II, the Japanese public had been hypersensitive to any issues with a tint of military. It had long been a “taboo” to discuss anything that smelled of the military. The bitter memory of the war, which was deeply rooted in the minds of the Japanese as a trauma, became shared norms, and had greatly constrained behaviour of the successive governments in security field (Katzenstein, 1996). Even a renewal of the security treaty with the US in 1960, which the public, especially leftists, saw as a stepping stone to re-militarization at the time, caused political turmoil. Thus civilian control of the military was a must in Japan, which meant a subordinate role for uniformed officers. Successive prime ministers had tended to keep their distance from the Self Defence Force (hereafter, the SDF). Any appearance of military access to political power would have proven publicly unpopular (Funabashi, 1997, pp. 83-133). Moreover, the structure of governments, which allowed the Cabinet Secretariat to have influence in decision-making, affected the institutional autonomy of the Defence Agency. The result was that any articulation of military objectives had not been encouraged (Katzenstein & Okawara, 1993, p.92). The structure of the government institutionalized strong civilian control. The political-military culture of anti-militarism thus had so far created a pattern of policy making in which defence initiatives were restricted (Berger, 1998, pp.194, 195). Military matters had long been subordinated to economic considerations.
Even the legitimacy of the SDF and the alliance with the US had been divisive issues among the public. The Japan Socialist Party, the largest left-wing opposition party, had adamantly opposed to the SDF and the alliance with the US, saying they were unconstitutional. Then a pacifist political culture was shared by even members in the LDP but the opposition from the Japan Socialist Party further helped create the pacifist political culture. In short, the Japanese had long been entrapped by “one country pacifism”.
In the immediate post-war period, it was economically difficult for Japan to direct its resources to rearmament. In addition, the US did not expect Japan to take up a military role but to effect a quick economic recovery as an ally. These factors had also limited Japan’s action in the security field. However, even after it became economically possible to direct Japan’s wealth to a military build up, thus encouraging the US to begin looking to Japan, Japan’s low-profile did not change. This is illustrated by Japan’s reluctance, even under US pressure, to take up a direct security role in the 1980s. That is to say, anti-militarist sentiment among the public, the subordination of military issues due to institutionalization, and a pacifist political culture had constrained successive governments in broadening their scope of action into the security area. Playing a role in the security field had been ruled out until the Japanese government and the public heard alarm bells at the time of the Gulf War in 1990-1991.
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| Contents > Trajectory of Japan’s security policy: the power of perceptions by Kyoko Hatakeyama |