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The Language of Populist Discourse In Australia, the language and ideas of populist discourse were developed by right wing think tanks, in journals such as Quadrant, and by talk back radio hosts such as John Laws and Alan Jones, in the years preceding the 1996 election. The most vituperative and concerted attacks on those deemed to be `special interests’ helped to `provide a language with which the coalition attacked the left’, and `also carved out a favourable intellectual climate within which this can occur.’ Consequently it was not difficult for Howard to mobilize this discourse in his election campaign. (Cahill, 2004: 92-3). The power of this discourse lies in its ability to mobilize these `fears, anxieties, resentments and insecurities in ways that complement the agendas of actually existing elites in Australian society’. (Cahill, 2004, 86) Howard seized on this power, heavily promoting an `us and them’ dichotomy around which resentments of the `mainstream’ could flourish. (Sawyer, 2006, 14) His use of this divisive rhetoric shifts responsibility for the community’s economic pain from the government to `equality seekers, a `new class elite’ consisting, among other things, of the Greens, gays, feminists, ethnics and the disabled, who are blamed for alienating the electorate. (Sawer, 2006, 14: Johns, 1996, cited in Sawer, 2006, 16). The central value of the welfare state, equal opportunity, is denied any legitimacy within this discourse. Multimillionaire talkback radio hosts encourage resentment towards the `elite’ which insists that taxpayers pay for ramps for the disabled. (Sawer, 2003). The equality seeking `elite’ is, according to this view, contemptuous of ordinary Australians, and their values, and seeks privilege for itself and welfare dependency for others. The idea, that the elite are contemptuous of ordinary people, is important in mobilizing emotion around the new discursive divide. (Sawer, 2003) This discourse:
(Cahill, 2004; 86) This use of rhetoric stifles real dissent through the use of an `all purpose pejorative such as `political correctness’, which amounts to little more than a blanket way of discrediting anything that looks remotely like a progressive idea, without having to resort to argument’. (Davis, 1997: 71, quoted in Cahill, 2004: 83) Where dissent is completely discredited, there is silence, which is in turn taken as consent. (Boniface VIII, cited in Horne, 2003: 12) Clearly language is power, and the government has seized the power of the new discourse to discredit any opposition to its policies, creating divisions between `the mainstream’ and those who would promote, or benefit from progressive policies. As a result, the disabled, and those who would argue on their behalf, are at the very least discouraged from speaking up for their rights. The narrative of public policy As Carol Bacchi has stated (1999: 199), `problems’ are the creation of the policy community. A policy proposal `necessarily contains a diagnosis of the problem to be addressed’. The narrative of much modern policy analysis is one of helplessness and control. A situation is described as bad, and previously out of control, but is now one that the government can control. (Stone, 2002: 142, 143). This narrative raises the issue of the extent to which we control our life conditions and destinies. (Stone, 2002: 142) Clearly, it fits closely with the individualistic basis of economic rationalism. `Conspiracy’ is a common twist in the control narrative. Control is in the hands of a few, who use it to their benefit, deliberately causing or knowingly tolerating the harm that it causes to the majority. The conspiracy twist of control narratives is designed to evoke moral condemnation and end with a call `to wrest control from the few who benefit at the expense of the many’. (Stone, 2002, 143-44) Tied in with the control narrative is the `blame the victim’ story, which locates control in the people who suffer the problem. In the same way that the conspiracy story ends with the call to the majority to rise up against the few, the blame the victim narrative ends with a call to the few (the victims) to reform their behaviour to avoid the problem. (Stone, 2002: 144) A further characteristic of control narratives is the horror story. An outlandish incident is deliberately chosen to represent the universe of cases, and to build support for changing the policy addressed to that wider universe of cases. Horror stories, often atypical and highly distorted, are considered to be a good organising tool, making a problem concrete, and allowing people to identify with someone else, and mobilizing anger. (Stone, 2002, 146-8) We live in an age where governments are becoming increasingly concerned with welfare dependency, likely to lead to long term poverty, with individuals acting imprudently and expecting the state to provide, and free-riding, that is, leaving others to pay for their benefits. (Travers, 2005, 92) In Australia, federal budget allocations for income support accounts for the largest item in social expenditure, and in the budget as a whole, as well. Spending in this category has grown between 1966 and 2001, in both absolute monetary value and as a proportion of total budget expenditure and of GDP. (Jamrozik, 2005: 135) In the context of the Howard government’s market based rationalist policy approach, the increasing cost of income support becomes the situation which was out of control.
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